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Abstract
Post Keynesian economics has largely forgotten Steindl’s insight that monopolisation of the
corporate sector redistributes profits to those firms least likely to invest them productively.
Agent-based methods can be used to incorporate Steindl’s insights into a simple stock-flow
consistent model of the monetary circuit. This model illustrates the ‘maldistribution of profits’
and ‘enforced indebtedness’ of heterogeneous firms alongside the tendency towards stagnation
that occurs with rising monopolisation. The model also demonstrates Minsky’s assertion that
firms’ leverage rises over the business cycle can be reconciled with Kalecki’s macroeconomic
identities showing that profits are ‘financed’ by the investment expenditures of firms.
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1 Introduction
In Post Keynesian theory the distribution of total income between labour and capital
is determined by the average mark-up of prices over costs in non-competitive markets.
In most models, that average mark-up is incorporated by imposing an unexplained
parameter representing the ‘degree of monopolisation’.1
This approach contrasts with that taken by Steindl (1952) in his groundbreaking work
on the tendencies of monoply capitalism. The ability of firms to impose uncompetitive
prices depends on their market power. Since the relative position of firms is not constant,
Steindl observed, the overall distribution of income will be affected not only by the size
of mark-ups imposed, but also by the shifting structure of the corporate sector.
With time, Steindl argues a monopolistic core of firms will come to dominate the
economy. The prices charged by those firms—and the share of output subject to such
pricing—will then rise and aggregate demand will fall. How firms react will depend on
their position in the market: monopolistic firms will resist the pressure to cut prices and
instead accept reduced demand for their output. Smaller firms, subject to competitive
forces, will be forced to cut prices in an attempt to maintain sales. The outcome will
be a divergence in profit margins and an increase in the relative profitability of large
monopolistic firms. If the squeeze on profits of competitive firms is intense some will go
out of business, further increasing the market power of the monopolists.
While monopolisation results in the redistribution of profits to larger firms, the re-
sulting weakness in aggregate demand leads to unused productive capacity. Large firms
with inelastic mark-ups will react by scaling back planned investment. The outcome
of monopolisation is the appropriation of profits by firms least likely to use them
productively.
Mark-up pricing plays a dual role in this process: at the microeconomic level, the
price system distributes profits among firms; at the macroeconomic level it determines
the distribution of income between labour and capital. The two processes cannot be
logically separated since feedback from both occurs via effective demand. Instead of
being determined by an exogenous average mark-up, the distribution between labour
and capital in Steindl’s model evolves on the basis of shifting market structure, rising
monopoly and a tendency towards stagnation.
Steindl’s model was an important influence on scholars who first developed ‘neo-
Kaleckian’ growth theory. The insight that firms may react to excess capacity by scaling
back investment plans was formalised in the seminal models of Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt
(1984). These models and their descendents form an important building block of the
‘stock-flow consistent’ (SFC) approach, which extends these models by adding accounts
for monetary and financial variables (Lavoie & Godley, 2001).2
These stock-flow consistent models are an important step forward: they formalise the
financial constraints logically imposed when self-contained economic systems are divided
1See Hein (2014) for an overview of Post Keynesian growth models.
2Stock-flow consistency is a general logical constraint. While most authors using the approach have favoured Post
Keynesian growth models as a basis, examples also exist of models from other theoretical traditions, such as neoclassical
dynamic general equilibrium, e.g. Kumhof & Rancie`re (2010)
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up by macroeconomic sector—firms, households and government—or by country. But
since these models tend to treat each sector as a single decision-making and accounting
unit, they inevitably abstract from microeconomic processes within those sectors—such
as shifts in market structure or debt-financed asset price inflation (Michell & Toporowski,
2011; Michell, 2014b).
Is has recently been argued that such shortcomings can be overcome by using ‘agent-
based’ modelling techniques (Caverzasi & Godin, 2014). These techniques first appeared
in cross-disciplinary research between computer science, physics and biology, before
being adopted by economists. They originated with models in which large numbers
of individual ‘units’ (such as animals or gas particles) interact on the basis of relatively
simple sets of rules. Despite the simplicity of the rules, the systems produce complex
behaviours such as herding and flocking.
The model presented in this paper uses the agent-based method to formalise Steindl’s
insights about the microeconomic aspects of monopolisation within a macro model of
the monetary circuit.3 The result is a system in which the distribution of profits and
income is not determined by an exogenous parameter, but instead evolves over time in
response to changing market structure. The distribution of leverage and liquidity among
firms is tracked using stock-flow accounting.
2 Distribution of income and profits in Kaleckian
and Post Keynesian economics
The distribution of income between wages and profits plays a central role in Post Key-
nesian economics. This contrasts with the approach taken by neoclassical economists,
who not only downplay the relevance of the division of income, but in general exclude
it from consideration entirely by assuming the economy behaves like a scaled-up Cobb-
Douglas production function (Michell, 2014a, pp. 8–9). While the capital-labour split
has recently been rediscovered by the mainstream in the wake of Piketty’s bestselling
Capital in the 21st Century (2014),4 these concerns form part of a much longer-standing
tradition among Post Keynesian scholars, particularly those working in the Kaleckian
tradition.
The primary determinant of the distribution between wages and profits in Kalecki’s
economics is the ‘average degree of monopoly’.5 In the simplest formulation it is assumed
that labour productivity is approximately constant below full employment. Firms set
prices as a fixed mark-up over marginal labour costs which are therefore also constant.
The share of profits in total income is then fixed by the output-weighted average mark-
up. Kalecki refers to this as the ‘degree of monopoly’—‘The relative share of gross
3See Argitis et al. (2014) for an overview of the monetary circuit.
4Piketty assumes that the economy behaves like a CES production function with an elasticity of substitution greater
than unity (Jump, 2014).
5Kalecki’s theory of income distribution is first introduced in Kalecki ([1938] 1990) and was further developed in
Kalecki ([1939] 1990, [1943] 1990, [1954] 1965).
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capitalist income and salaries in the aggregate turnover is with great approximation
equal to the average degree of monopoly.’ ([1938] 1990, p. 9)6
The ‘average degree of monopoly’ is thus determined by two factors: the degree
of monopoly in each industrial sector and the relative weight of each industry in the
economy.
Kalecki was criticised by his contemporary, Oscar Lange, for his tendency to overlook
the significance of shifts in demand and production between industries:
The average degree of monopoly for the whole economy being a weighted
mean is changed by a shift in output between industries. Thus it has little
meaning to say that the distribution of income is ‘determined’ by the average
degree of monopoly. (Lange, 1941, p. 281, quoted in Kriesler, 1987, p. 48)
Since shifts in industrial structure will affect the average mark-up, changes in the
composition of demand will alter the functional distribution of income. Assuming that
the propensity to consume out of profits is lower than out of wages, such shifts will lead
to changes in aggregate demand, output and total employment.
Uneven monopoly power across firms and industries also has implications for the
distribution of profits among corporations:
The changes in the degree of monopoly are not only of decisive importance
for the distribution of income between workers and capitalists, but in some
instances for the distribution of income within the capitalist class as well.
Thus, the rise in the degree of monopoly caused by the growth of big corpo-
rations results in a relative shift of income to industries dominated by such
corporations from other industries. In this way income is distributed from
small to big business (Kalecki, [1954] 1965, p. 18)
This observation provides the starting point for Steindl’s classic work on the monop-
olisation of the US corporate sector, Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism
(1952) which explicitly incorporates the distribution of profits among firms. Steindl
introduces the idea that monopoly will lead to the ‘maldistribution of profits’. He
argues that in a competitive market firms will react to excess capacity by cutting prices
and lowering profit margins. This cost-cutting will drive out ‘marginal’ producers so
concentration increases. Once competition gives way to oligopoly, larger firms are no
longer under pressure to engage in cost-cutting and cease to react by cutting prices but
instead reduce output.
The long-run tendency towards increasing industrial concentration leads to the emer-
gence of a ‘cartelised’ sector of the economy, characterised by a high degree of monopoly.
At the same time, there remains a fringe of firms operating in markets which reason-
ably approximate a competitive structure. The relative inelasticity of mark-ups in the
cartelised sector of the economy results in higher gross profit margins for these firms. The
tendency towards concentration results generated a rising share of profits in the cartelised
sector, at the expense of competitive firms. The outcome of this ‘maldistribution of
profits’ is disproportionately higher gearing ratios among small competitive firms.
6Kalecki’s classification of salaries alongside profits—not labour income—tends to be overlooked in recent work.
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Figure 1 US capacity utilisation: total industry, per cent of capacity
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2014)
Overall, the result of increasing monopolisation is twofold: in the macroeconomic
sphere, a tendency towards stagnation, under-investment and excess capacity and, in
the microeconomic sphere, a divergence between the cash piles of monopolists and rising
leverage in the rest of the corporate sector.
These predictions, made in 1952, appear to have stood the test of time. Figure 1 shows
the rate of capacity utilisation for the total industrial sector of the United States since
1967. A steady downward trend is clear: following each recession, capacity utilisation
fails to regain its previous level.
Figure 2 shows selected items from the consolidated balance sheet of the US non-
financial corporate sector. Non-financial assets—the capital stock—rose from around
110% of GDP to peak at just under 150% of GDP in the early 1980s before declining
to under 100% in the early 1990s and in the aftermath of the 2008 recession. Over the
period, gross debt has risen steadily but this increase has been more than matched by
an even greater increase in holdings of financial assets.
Steindl’s emphasis on the importance of excess capacity influenced those authors who
developed what came to be known as the Kaleckian growth model (Rowthorn, 1981;
Dutt, 1984). The key feature of this model is an investment function of form,
gI = γ0 + γrr + γuu (1)
where gIi is investment in growth terms, r is the rate of profit and u the rate of capacity
utilisation. By embedding this equation in an aggregate demand-driven model, a system
which exhibits ‘wage-led’ growth is obtained: an increase in the share of income received
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Figure 2 Consolidated balance sheet of US non-financial corporate sector
Source: Federal Reserve (2014), author’s calculation
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by labour raises consumption demand which in turn stimulates investment, leading to
higher growth.
This investment function was criticised by Bhaduri & Marglin (1990), among others,
for the assumption that the economy may operate above full capacity over the long
run (See Lavoie, 1995, for a discussion). Bhaduri & Marglin propose an alternative
investment function in which the rate of profit is replaced with the profit share. On the
basis of the modified investment function, it is shown that the economy can be either
‘wage-led’ or ‘profit-led’ depending on the relative strength of the effects of capacity
utilisation and the profit share. This inspired a large empirical literature which sets out
to determine whether countries are in fact wage-led or profit led.7
Both the theoretical and empirical literature tends to take as given the mark-up deter-
mining the functional distribution of labour—treating it as an exogenous parameter in
theoretical models and an explanatory variable in econometric specifications.8 Steindl’s
insight that monopoly firms tend to drain funds from the circular flow, thus increasing
the fragility of competitive firms, has not been been pursued in the Post Keynesian
literature. The model presented in this paper develops this aspect of Steindl’s analysis.
3 Stock-flow consistent microfoundations
The stock-flow consistent approach originates with the work of Godley & Cripps (1983)
and was subsequently developed by Lavoie & Godley (2001) and Godley & Lavoie (2007).
The method uses flow-of-funds accounting techniques to add financial and monetary
variables to macroeconomic models. Consistency is maintained by requiring that the
sum of financial transactions over any given time period sums to zero and that the
sum of financial assets and liabilities on the aggregate balance sheet also sums to zero
(Michell, 2012).
The widespread adoption of stock-flow consistent techniques by Post Keynesian au-
thors has generated a rapidly expanding literature (a comprehensive summary is given
by Caverzasi & Godin, 2014). One open debate within this literature relates to the
issue of microfoundations. Michell & Toporowski (2011) argue that model-building
on the basis of macroeconomic aggregates rules out the analysis of those financial
market processes which are mainly driven by transactions between agents in the same
macroeconomic sector. Such processes include debt-financed asset bubbles (household
sector) and mergers and acquisitions booms (firms sector).
7The seminal contribution to this literature was the study by Bowles & Boyer (1995). Significant subsequent
contributions include Naastepad & Storm (2007) and Stockhammer et al. (2009). Hein & Vogel (2008) provide a good
literature review.
8Bhaduri & Marglin (1990) qualify their approach with the comment ‘. . . in order to examine the connection between
real wage and unemployment it is necessary to perform at least ’thought experiments’ based on exogenous variations in
the real wage rate.’ (p. 376). The approach has been criticised by Toporowski: ‘In Kalecki’s analysis of capitalism, profits
are determined by capitalists’ consumption and their investment . . . The function of the price system is to distribute that
surplus around the capitalists and firms in the economy. This is a key point that distinguishes Kalecki’s theory from
that of many Ricardian Marxists, and Post-Keynesians, for whom profits are a mark-up on labour costs, so that the price
system determines the distribution of income between wages and profits.’ (Toporowski, 2011)
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This, of course, is a shortcoming of almost all macroeconomic models, whether Post
Keynesian or of the neoclassical representative-agent variety. But it has serious implica-
tions for models designed with monetary and financial realism as defining characteristics.
As well as financial market process, these models also face difficulties with the dy-
namics of distribution of income, wealth or leverage among individual units within
macroeconomic sectors—at least when going beyond simple two- or three-way divisions
such as splitting households into workers and rentiers. It is this type of process that is
at the heart of Steindl’s model.
One proposal for overcoming these issues is to use agent-based modelling (ABM)
techniques to provide microfoundations for stock-flow consistent models. Proponents of
such a synthesis include Bezemer (2011) but, so far, only a handful of models of this
type have yet emerged—e.g. Kinsella et al. (2011); Carvalho & Guilmi (2014). Using
Steindl’s theory as point of departure, this paper makes an initial exploration of hybrid
SFC-ABM macro modelling.
Agent-based methods provide a way to capture distributional dynamics within the
firms sector as market structure varies. By keeping track of both the financial positions
of individual firms and macroeconomic monetary aggregates, it can be shown that gross
debt positions arising out of the ‘maldistribution of profits’ can rise—leading to an
expansion of bank balance sheets—even while the net deficit of the firms’ sector as a
whole falls. This is because the cash stockpiles that accumulate on balance sheets of
large monopoly firms outweigh the rising leverage of smaller competitive firms. Such a
pattern was visible in advanced economies in the run up to the 2008 crisis (although
the situation was complicated by the extensive use of debt to finance leveraged buy-
outs, equity buy-backs and dividend payouts, Lazonick & Mazzucato, 2013; Michell,
2014b). Since 2008, the accumulation of cash and other liquid assets by large firms has
accelerated, with stockpiles reaching record levels (Economist, 2012; FT, 2014)
The model described here sheds light on a tension in Minsky’s analysis, highlighted
by Lavoie & Seccareccia (2001) and Toporowski (2008) among others. This tension
arises out of the problems of reconciling Minsky’s assertion that financial fragility—
the leverage ratio of firms—tends to rise during an investment boom with Kaleckian
accounting identities which demonstrate that macroeconomic profits rise pari passu with
investment expenditure. The model demonstrates how the relative weight of firms with
‘Ponzi’ financing structures can rise relative to those with ‘hedged’ balance sheets, even
as the financial deficit of the firms’ sector falls and total cash holdings of the firms sector
increases.
4 A Steindlian model of the corporate sector
4.1 Overview
The model presented in this section is in the spirit of Steindl, not the letter. The
model captures Steindl’s key insight that differential monopoly pricing power will lead
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to divergence in profits and leverage. The model is relatively primitive in assumptions
but nonetheless generates a rich range of behaviour.
Following Steindl (1952), Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984), the main feature of the
model is a ‘wage-led’ investment function. Unlike previous aggregate demand-driven
models in which this function describes the behaviour of the sector as a whole, each firm
makes a separate investment decision based on outcomes realised in the previous period.
Instead of the investment function presented in Steindl (1952), the more widely-
discussed version from the Rowthorn-Dutt class of models is substituted. It is assumed
that the parameters of this investment function are the same for each firm. Heterogeneity
is introduced by allowing the balance sheet of each firm to evolve independently, and
assuming that the pricing behaviour of each firm depends on its relative strength in the
market.
In addition to investment in capital goods, firms also make a decision on how much
output to produce in each period. Uncertainty over future demand leads to the possibility
that sales plans may not be achieved and profits not realised. This contrasts with the
formulation in simple Post Keynesian growth models in which goods market clearing is
assumed by enforcing the identity that saving equals investment. These models, and
related empirical research such as Stockhammer et al. (2009), have been criticised by
dos Santos (2013) for their reliance on the market clearing assumption—an implication
of dropping this assumption is that, even with a ‘wage-led’ investment function, an
increase in growth may be achieved alongside a rising profit share if firms run down
inventories. More importantly, the possibility exists that consumer goods may remain
unsold due to an insufficiency of demand. Realised profits are determined by sales while
capacity utilisation is determined by production decisions—regardless of whether the
goods produced are sold.
The firms sector is combined with a simple Keynesian macroeconomic consumption
function and a consolidated ‘horizontalist’ banking sector. The banking sector is assumed
to fully accommodate all demands for loans at a fixed exogenous rate of interest. It pays
the same rate of interest on deposits as it charges on loans and makes no profits. No
consideration is given to issues of capital adequacy or liquidity. Bankruptcy is treated in
a highly simplified way by assuming that households’ deposits are reduced when loans
are written off.
The model is constructed on the basis of two main logical blocs. The first is the
heterogeneous firms sector. Decisions are made by individual firms on the basis of
their current balance sheet and their expectations about the future. Balance sheets are
tracked for each firm. The second bloc is a simple stock-flow consistent simultaneous
equation system. Accounting logic is used to ensure that the stocks and flows generated
by individual firms sum exactly to the equivalent aggregates at the macroeconomic level.
Godley & Lavoie introduce what they call the ‘quasi-Walrasian’ principle for checking
the consistency of stock-flow consistent systems. This principle states that any stock-flow
consistent system will be over-determined, since any single equation of an n-equation
system will be logically implied by the other n − 1 equations of the system. The
consistency of the system can thus be checked by dropping any single equation—usually
the identity that the demand for money equals the supply of money is chosen—and
8
Households Firms Banks Total
Fixed capital +K +K
Inventories +IV +IV
Deposits +Dh +Df −DS 0
Loans −LD +LS 0
Total (Net Worth) NWh NWf 0 +(K + IV )
Table 1 Macroeconomic balance sheet of the model.
Fixed capital +ki
Inventories +ivi
Deposits +dfi
Loans −li
Total (Net Worth) nwi
Table 2 Balance sheet of an individual firm, i.
ensuring that it is nonetheless fulfilled when the system is simulated numerically. This
principle is extended to cover the microeconomic agent-based bloc of the system.
4.2 Model structure
Starting with the macroeconomic bloc, the aggregate balance sheet of the model is
shown in Table 1. The economy is divided into three sectors: households, firms and a
consolidated banking system. Assets are denoted with a plus sign and liabilities with
a minus sign. Most of the action takes place within the firms’ sector: firms hold both
fixed capital and inventories of finished consumer goods and finance their positions using
loans obtained from the banking system. Additionally, firms are assumed to manage
their liquidity by holding bank deposits. Households hold only one type of asset: bank
deposits. The banking system issues loans and takes deposits from both firms and
households.
Households supply labour to firms and receive wages in return while also receiving
interest from banks on their deposits. It is assumed that in each period, households
choose how much to consume as a fixed proportion of previous-period income and wealth.
Saving is a residual, determined once total output and employment are known.
The most detailed part of the model is the firms sector. There are a large number
N heterogeneous firms. Each firm i ∈ N has a balance sheet as shown in Table 2.
This reproduces the balance sheet of the aggregate firms sector from Table 1 at the
microeconomic level.
In line with the Post Keynesian literature, it is assumed that there exists a completely
elastic supply of constant-productivity labour so firms face no constraints in their output
decision. Heterogeneity in the firms sector is modelled on the basis of different stocks of
assets and liabilities on firms’ balance sheets. The greater the size of the firm—proxied
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by the volume of fixed capital held—the greater the market power and thus the price
mark-up imposed by the firm.
The system is modelled in discrete-time. Decision-making and accounting is done in a
three-step process in each time-period. In the first step, firms and the household sector
make decisions about consumption, investment, output, pricing and finance. In the
second step, aggregate values are found by summing over all firms in order to determine
the values of macroeconomic variables. These variables are inserted into the stock-flow
consistent macro bloc of the model and the system is solved, yielding total aggregate
demand.
The third and final step of the model involves distributing this aggregate demand
among the heterogeneous firms. Demand is distributed on the basis of the relative
‘size’ of the firms but also incorporates a stochastic element. This stochastic element
moderates the tendency towards increasing monopolisation. Once the the total demand
faced by each firm is known, final balance sheet positions for each firm can be calculated.
4.3 Specification of the model
Specification of the model is presented in order of the three-stage process outlined above.
In the first step, each firm makes behavioural decisions based on outcomes realised in
the preceding period.
4.3.1 Decisions made by firms before production commences
Before commencing production, each firm makes decisions about the following magni-
tudes: output (which determines how many workers to hire); new fixed capital invest-
ment; and new bank borrowing.
Firms’ investment decisions are the drivers of the whole system—in Kaleckian and
Keynesian demand-driven systems, it is the investment decisions of firms which most
directly effect aggregate demand.
The investment function is taken from the neo-Kaleckian growth model of Rowthorn
(1981) and Dutt (1984) discussed above. The formulation is a slightly modified version
of Equation 1:
gIi = γ0 + γrri(−1) + γuui(−1) (2)
This investment function has been chosen because its properties—as a macroeconomic
behavioural equation, at least—have been investigated extensively (see the discussion in
Section 2). Here, however, the function specifies the investment decision of an individual
firm. The equation states that the capital accumulation of each firm (in growth terms)
is determined on the basis of three factors: firstly, by ‘animal spirits’, represented by
an exogenous parameter, γ0, secondly, by the rate of profit, r, achieved in the previous
period and, thirdly, by capacity, u, used in the previous period. The greater the degree
of unused productive capacity, the lower the intended rate of accumulation. This may
be outweighed, however, if the rate of profit is supported by high profit margins caused
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by monopoly mark-up pricing. γr and γu are parameters that fix the sensitivity of
investment to the rate of profit and to capacity utilisation.
The rate of profit and the degree of capacity utilisation for each firm are defined as
follows,
ri = ei/ki (3)
ui = yi/yfi (4)
where ei is the expenditure spent on output produced by firm i over the period (total
revenue), ki is the ‘size’ of the capital stock held by the firm, yi is the output produced
over the period. Capacity utilisation is defined as the ratio of output to the full-capacity
output of the firm, yfi . This is defined as follows,
yfi = vki (5)
where the capital/full capacity output ratio, v, is treated as an exogenous parameter.
Since at the time the firm makes its investment decision, these ratios are not yet
known, the decision is made on the basis of demand and profits in the previous period.
Once the desired growth of the capital stock is determined, the demand for investment,
ιD by firm i is,
ιDi = g
I
i · ki (6)
Each firm must decide on output, pricing and employment. The firm makes a predic-
tion of sales it will achieve, eEi , on the basis of previous period revenue, ei(−1) scaled by
the growth rate, gIi ,
eEi = ei(−1)(1 + g
I
i ) (7)
Firms are assumed to hold a stock of inventories to cope with unexpected increases in
demand. The desired level of inventories, ivDi is a proportion of expected sales.
ivDi = ρ · eEi (8)
Each firm’s production decision is then based on predicted revenues and relative size of
current inventories relative to desired inventories.
yi = e
E
i + iv
D
i − ivi (9)
Once the firm has decided how much to produce, it then decides on the price mark-up
it will impose. This is determined on the basis of the relative size of the firm. The ‘size’
of each firm is proxied by the firms’ share of total fixed capital,
si = ki/K (10)
where K =
∑
ki. The mark-up of prices over wages, τi is then determined as follows,
τi = siNT (11)
where N is the number of firms and T is an exogenous parameter representing the degree
of monopolisation (or weakness of labour) in the economy as whole. Thus, an ‘average
sized’ firm will impose a mark-up of T, while a firm double the average size will impose
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a mark-up of 2T, and so on. The ‘degree of monopoly’ is thus not fully endogenous—
the model still relies on an exogenous parameter for the overall strength of capital. In
general, however, this will differ from the ‘average degree of monopoly’ which depends
on market structure and the relative size of firms.
The gross profit margin this firm intends to achieve on the basis of realised sales is,
mi =
τi
1 + τi
(12)
Assuming constant labour productivity, the wage bill implied by this gross margin is the
following
wbi =
yi
mi · yi (13)
Now the firm must decide how much, if at all, it needs to borrow. Firms are assumed to
hold a stock of liquidity—bank deposits—in order to cope with unexpected shortfalls in
demand. The minimum volume of deposits desired is determined as a proportion θ of
current expenditures—the wage bill and net interest payments:
dDfi = θ · [wbi + r¯ · (lfi(−1) − dfi(−1))] (14)
The liquidity the firm expects to hold at the end of the period without further borrowing
is calculated on the basis of deposits held at the end of the previous period and expected
net profits less intended investment
dEfi = dfi(−1) + e
E
i − wbi − r¯ · (lfi(−1) − dfi(−1))− ιdi (15)
Finally, it is assumed that firms make an asymmetric decision on borrowing. If predicted
liquidity exceeds desired liquidity, firms make no change to their borrowing and keep
excess liquidity on their balance sheets (Toporowski, 2010). On the other hand, if faced
with a shortfall of liquidity, firms request new loans to make up the deficit.
∆lDi =
{
dDfi − dEfi, if dDfi ≥ dEfi
0, otherwise
(16)
4.3.2 The macroeconomic stock-flow model
The second stage of the simulation process involves summing over flows generated by
individual firms in order to obtain aggregate flows. Total output is given by the sum of
firms’ output.
Y =
∑
yi (17)
The total wage bill is the sum of firms’ wage bills.
WB =
∑
wbi (18)
Investment demand is the sum of individual firms’ investment demands. It is assumed
that the supply of capital goods accommodates demand (firms correctly predict the
demand for new capital goods) so that the change in the capital stock is equal to
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investment demand.
∆K = ID =
∑
ιDi (19)
Finally, the total demand for new lending is given by the sum of loan demands from
firms. Since a pure ‘horizontalist’ banking sector is assumed, this will also be the level
of loans supplied.
∆LS = ∆LD =
∑
∆lDi (20)
Household consumption and total aggregate demand can now be calculated. Total
household income is the sum of the wage bill and interest received on bank deposits held
at the end of the previous period.
Yh = WB + r¯ ·Dh(−1) (21)
As with firms, the consumption of the household sector is determined on the basis
of previous-period outcomes. The consumption function is a linear function of both
previous-period income and previous-period wealth (assumed to be held entirely as
deposits),
CD = α1Yh(−1) + α2Dh(−1) (22)
Households’ saving—and thus the change in their holdings of bank deposits—is a residual
given by the difference between income received and consumption expenditure.
∆Dh = Sh = Yh − CD (23)
Total expenditure is the sum of consumption and investment demand
E = CD + ID (24)
Since firms’ production decisions, and thus their wage payment commitments, are
decided before total aggregate demand is known, total production of goods and total
demand for those goods will not, in general, be equal. Firms face a problem of realisation
of profit: if sales predictions are overly optimistic, firms will accumulate inventories and
profits will be below expectations. Total profits are given by revenues (total expenditure)
less costs (the wage bill).
FT = E −WB (25)
Just as inventories adjust to accommodate excess supply or demand in the consumer
goods market due mistakes in predictions about demand, firms’ money balances adjust
to accommodate realised profits. Thus, the change in firms’ aggregate deposits is given
by the change in total borrowing plus total profits less net interest payments on previous
period net lending and expenditure on investment on fixed capital.
∆Df = ∆LS + FT − r · [LS(−1) −Df(−1)]− ID (26)
The total ‘demand’ for deposits is:
∆DD = ∆Dh + ∆Df (27)
From the balance sheet of the banking system, the supply of loans must equal the
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supply of deposits
∆DS = ∆LS (28)
4.3.3 Accounting performed after solving the macroeconomic system
Once the system of equations in Section 4.3.2 has been solved, total aggregate expendi-
ture on consumption goods and fixed capital is known. This aggregate demand is then
distributed amongst firms according to the following equation
ei = ζ · si + (1− ζ) · i (29)
Where i is a stochastic variable such that
∑
i = 1. The variable ζ is a parameter
which determines the extent to which total aggregate demand is randomly distributed
(ζ = 0) or distributed entirely on the basis of the relative size of firms (ζ = 1). Since∑
i =
∑
ki = 1, the sum of shares of expenditures will sum to total aggregate demand:∑
ei = E
Each firm is then in a position to compare expected revenues with actual revenues,
and thus to discover how much profit has been realised in this period. Realised gross
profits are the difference between revenues and wage costs,
fi = ei − wbi (30)
and the change in inventories will equal the difference between expected and actual sales
∆ivi = yi − ei (31)
The change in deposits held by this firm can be calculated. Since we have assumed
a horizontalist banking system, any demand for lending will have been granted and the
change in loans, ∆li held by the firm will equal the demand for loans ∆lDi. Likewise,
it is assumed that firms correctly predict the demand for capital goods, so that supply
adjusts to meet demand and each firm’s investment, ιi, is equal to its investment demand
ιDi. However the possibility of bankruptcy must first be considered.
4.3.4 Bankruptcy
The possibility exists that realised profits falling short of expected profits—and firms may
even make losses. Firms use their stocks of bank deposits to cover unexpected shortfalls
and replenish their liquidity in the subsequent period by borrowing from banks.
The possibility also exists that firms will have insufficient cash on hand to cover costs
in the current period. In this case the firm is considered bankrupt and must default on
its loans.
For the sake of simplicity, bankruptcy is treated in a cursory way. Once a firm is
declared bankrupt, its financial balance sheet is wiped clean—the loans owed by that
firm are written off. It is assumed that capital and inventories are retained and the firm
is able to resume trading.
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Instead of modelling bank capital directly, the hit is proxied by reducing bank deposits
held by households. Bankruptcies thus reduce the net worth of the household sector
relative to the corporate sector.9
Formally, the ‘net cash position’—i.e. the surplus or shortfall—is given by the stock
of deposits plus net profits (gross profits minus interest payments), less investment
expenditures, plus the current period increase in borrowing.
n = dfi(−1) + fi − r · (lfi(−1) − dfi(−1))− ιi + ∆li (32)
So bankruptcy can be represented by the following conditional statement
dfi =
{
n, if n ≥ 0
0, otherwise
(33)
This requires the following adjustments to be made to balance sheet stocks at both
the micro and macro levels:
∆LS = ∆LD = ∆Dh = ∆DS = ∆li =
{
−li if n ≥ 0
0, otherwise
(34)
In the case that the firm is not declared bankrupt, the change in deposits held by each
firm will thus be equal to the following
∆dfi = fi − r · (lfi(−1) − dfi(−1))− ιi + ∆li (35)
4.3.5 Summary variables and consistency checking
The macro system described in Section 4.3.2 has one equation missing. This is the
identity that the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ for bank deposits must be equal:
∆DD = ∆DS (36)
This equation is not included because it is logically implied by the other equations of
the system—Godley & Lavoie (2007) refer to this as the ‘quasi-Walrasian’ principle.
This identity provides a way to check the stock-flow consistency of the system: when
simulating the system numerically the identity must hold.
In the combined SFC-ABM approach developed here, the quasi-Walrasian principle
can be extended to check the consistency between the micro and macro blocs of the
model. Equation 26 is the identity stating that the change in total firms’ deposits is a
residual determined by realised profits. This equation can also be calculated by summing
over the deposits held by firms at the end of the period (after bankruptcy adjustments).
DF =
∑
dfi (37)
9This treatment of bankruptcy is unsatisfactory—a more realistic approach would be to assume that some of the
the capital stock and inventories of bankrupt firms will be bought at reduced rates by other firms and the remainder
abandoned.
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At no point in the simulation is this aggregate value substituted into the macroeconomic
system of simultaneous equations. Nonetheless, if the model is stock-flow consistent, this
must equal the value calculated at the aggregate level.10
When the model is simulated, both Equations 36 and 37 are found to hold. This
confirms that the model is stock-flow consistent at both the macroeconomic and microe-
conomic levels. Given the relative simplicity of the model presented here, checking the
consistency of the system of equations is a relatively straightforward process. However,
the modelling approach taken here could be extended to produce more complex models,
increasing the importance of this consistency checking procedure.
Finally, aggregate measures of the average gross profit margin, the rate of profit and
the overall level of capacity utilisation are calculated. The aggregate gross profit margin
is given by,
m =
E −WB
E
(38)
and from this, the ‘average degree of monopoly’ can be determined. The (average) rate
of profit is,
r = Ft/K (39)
and the overall level of capacity utilisation,
u = Y/YF (40)
These measures will be used when simulating the model to summarise the results in
terms of familiar macroeconomic variables.
5 Simulation results
5.1 Speed of concentration
The model is simulated for 250 periods. While these are labelled ‘1000’–‘1250’, these
numbers are arbitrary so this should be not be thought of as representing any particular
period of historical time.
The initial parameters are shown in the Appendix. The model is simulated with ζ
in the range 0.5–0.9. This parameter determines how aggregate demand is distributed
among firms. The higher the value, the weaker the stochastic element in the allocation
of demand—and the more powerful the process of concentration.
The results of the simulations are shown in Figures 3 and 4 of the Appendix. Each of
the two figures contains three columns of graphs. From left to right, these columns show
simulation results with ζ set at 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9—the tendency towards concentration is
weakest in the leftmost column and strongest in the rightmost.
Starting with Figure 3, the top row shows the distribution of capital among firms.
The X-axis shows the size of the capital stock held by each firm, normalised so the
10A similar check can be made to ensure that the total aggregate change in inventories IV found by summing over
individual firms balance sheets is equal to the level implied by the macroeconomic identity ∆IV = Y − E.
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mean is equal to one. The Y-axis shows the number of firms holding that amount of
capital. Each graph shows the initial distribution (blue) and the final distribution after
simulation (green).
In all three cases, the initial allocation of capital is made so that there are approx-
imately equal numbers of firms of each size between zero and twice the mean. When
monopolisation is strongly moderated by randomisation (ζ = 0.5), the distribution of
capital converges on what resembles a normal distribution—as predicted by the Central
Limit Theorem. When the stochastic element is minimised however (ζ = 0.9), the
distribution becomes heavily skewed, with a large cluster of below-average sized firms
alongside a long tail of large firms. This resembles the log-normal distribution for firms
that Steindl (1965) noted in the empirical data. The intermediate case (ζ = 0.7) looks
close to a normal distribution but is skewed so that the majority of firms are slightly
below the mean.
The second row of Figure 3 plots the growth of investment (green) and output (red)
against time. In the ζ = 0.5 case, the model exhibits cyclical behaviour. This is because
stochastic shocks generate and amplify feedbacks between investment and output in
the presence of backward-looking expectations: when aggregate demand exceeds ex-
pectations, investment increases, raising output, capacity utilisation and profits. As
the capital stock increases, the rate of profit eventually peaks and investment stalls.
This resembles the business cycle mechanism outlined by Kalecki ([1939] 1990) with the
difference that lags in expectations replace lags in the production of the capital stock.
In the case that (ζ = 0.7), this cyclical pattern is still discernible but much weaker.
Instead the main pattern is a a gradual increase in the rate of growth as market structure
adjusts to its final pattern. To understand this pattern, the remaining rows of Figure
3 must be inspected. These show the aggregate rate of profit, r, aggregate capacity
utilisation u and the wage share WB/Y plotted against time.
All three measures rise as market structure converges towards a ‘steady state’: a
stronger tendency towards monopolisation leads the system to converge on a distribution
with a higher aggregate wage share and higher rate of growth: with ζ = 0.5, GDP growth
oscillates between 4% and 5%; with ζ = 0.7 growth converges towards 8%.
When the randomisation of demand that restrains corporate concentration is weak
(ζ = 0.9) a third pattern emerges. As a few large firms rise to dominate the economy,
the aggregate profit rate rises as in the intermediate case. However, the dominance
of the monopolistic sector leads to a falling wage share and rising excess capacity, as
predicted by Steindl. The rising rate of profit is not enough to outweigh the depressive
tendencies arising from excess capacity, and investment and GDP growth fall steadily.
This configuration in fact fails to converge to a ‘steady state’ market structure as in
the other two cases: the long-run outcome of simulations with this set of parameters
is a binary distribution in which a single firm ends up being the ‘whole economy’ and
the remaining firms are eliminated. There is thus a tipping point beyond which the
self-reinforcing effect of concentration overwhelms the stochastic element.
The microeconomic patterns that emerge within the firms’ sector are summarised in
Figure 4. This figure shows how growth rates, profit rates, capacity utilisation and
financial assets and liabilities are distributed among firms after simulation is complete.
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As in the first row of Figure 3, the X-axis of all sub-figures lists the sizes of firms,
normalised so the mean equals one. The first three rows of the figure show plots of firm
size against firm-level investment growth rates, gIi , profit rates ri and capacity utilisation
ui. Each point in each sub-figure represents a single firm.
The greater the degree of monopolisation, the greater the degree of polarisation in
profit rates and capacity utilisation. When ζ = 0.5, profits and utilisation rates appear
almost randomly distributed among firms. However, after a strong concentration process
(zeta = 0.9), clear patterns emerge.
For smaller firms, variance in all three measures is high—this will in part be due to
the fact that the size of stochastic shocks will be relatively larger for small firms, so
there will be more ‘noise’ at the lower end of the scale. Variance decreases with firm
size and a positive trend between firm size, growth and profits is emerges. Thus, within
the firms sector, large firms are more profitable and invest and grow faster—but at the
aggregate level (Figure 3) this process increases the overall market share of large firms,
leading to excess capacity and slowing total investment and growth.
On the other hand, even within the firms sector, capacity utilisation falls as firm size
increases—large firms tend to operate with more excess capacity than smaller firms.
The fourth row of the matrix shows the distribution of loans among firms. This is
measured in ‘nominal’ terms (i.e. not normalised as a share of capital stock).11 With
a strong stochastic component in the demand distribution function, the distribution of
loans shows no clear pattern. However, with a concentrated firms sector, an inverted-U
shape is displayed. This can be explained as follows: since the nominal borrowing of
each firm is not normalised against the size of that firm, with an even distribution of
leverage among firms, a positive linear relationship between firm size and debt levels
would be expected: large firms will have greater debts in order to finance their (larger)
capital stocks. This is the pattern generated for firms below the mean. Once firm
size increases beyond the mean, however, leverage starts to fall so that firms greater
in size than four times the mean have no almost no debt: the higher share of output
and profits accruing to large monopolist firms allows them to finance their investment
entirely through retained earnings.
The same series is plotted in red on the final row of the Figure. This time it is
normalised against the capital stock of the firm. For the case ζ = 0.9, a clear inverse
relationship between firm size and debt is shown. This pattern is also visible in the
case ζ = 0.7, although the variance is much greater. No obvious pattern can be seen
when ζ = 0.5—this row of sub-figures also includes the cash balances held by the firms
sector (green). This clusters around the target liquidity ratio of firms, except in the
case of large firms in the presence of strong concentration. These firms hold large cash
balances, well in excess of that needed for day-to-day liquidity management, because the
profits of these firms exceeds their desired investment so that firms have no choice but
to accumulate cash stockpiles.
Finally, ‘net leverage’ is also shown for each firm (in blue). This is calculated as loans
less deposits as a proportion of real capital. With concentration, this measure has a
11The units for the two rightmost plots are millions of ‘pounds’.
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clear negative relationship with firm size—and beyond a certain level turns negative—
large firms have no debts and hold large cash stockpiles. Steindl’s insights about ‘forced
indebtedness’ of small business and the ‘maldistribution of profits’ in favour of large
firms emerge clearly. The simulations also closely recreate the patterns seen in Figures
1 and 2
5.2 Financial fragility
The model can also be used to shed light on the fallacy of composition allegedly com-
mitted by Minsky ([1975] 2008; [1986] 2008) in his Financial Instability Hypothesis—by
arguing that leverage ratios rise over the course of the business cycle, Minsky appears
to contradict Kalecki’s ([1954] 1965) macroeconomic accounting identities which demon-
strate that higher investment leads to higher profits.12
Minsky’s analysis involves classifying firms on the basis of the soundness of their
balance sheet. Firms are divided between three categories: ‘hedge’ firms, which are able
to repay both principal and interest out of profits, ‘speculative’ firms, which can cover
interest payments only, and ‘Ponzi’ firms that must borrow in order to pay interest due
on past borrowing. During an investment boom, Minsky argues, the fragility of balance
sheets weakens so that a shock—such as a rise in the rate of interest—can lead to an
increase in Ponzi financing structures and crisis.
The balance sheets of firms in our model can be classified along the lines suggested
by Minsky. Since questions of risk and maturity have been abstracted from and loans
are assumed to be continually rolled over, an assumption on the maturity of loans needs
to be made. If it is assumed that loans are granted for five periods, in order for a firm
to be a ‘hedge’ unit, profits in each period must exceed interest payments plus a fifth of
outstanding loans. A speculative firm is one in which profits are less than that of hedge
firms but still sufficient to pay interest in each period without recourse to further debt. A
Ponzi firm is one for which profits are insufficient even to cover interest payments. This
classification scheme is a bit rough and ready but will serve as a first approximation.
Figure 5 uses the same column structure as Figures 3 and 4. The first row shows
household saving as a share of GDP plotted against time. Since households hold no
capital and the net financial position of the banking sector is assumed equal to zero,
household saving is equal to the net financial deficit of the firms sector. In the cases
ζ = 0.5 and ζ = 0.7, this deficit is close to constant over the long run. In the high-
concentration case, however, household saving—and thus the deficit of the firms sector—
is steadily decreasing. This is the result of the falling share of wages in total income.
At the same time, as shown in the next row, the concentration of firms leads to rising
investment as a share of GDP.
The final row of 5 shows the evolution of the financial structure of the firms sector
over time. The number of hedge firms (green), speculative firms (blue) and Ponzi firms
(red) are shown as well as the number of bankruptcies per period (light blue). In the
case with the least concentration, nearly half of firms are classified as ‘Ponzi’ and an
12See Lavoie & Seccareccia (2001), Toporowski (2008) and Passarella (2012) for discussion.
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average of about 50 bankruptcies occur each period. The reason for this is the lower
rate of growth (around five percent) in this scenario. It should be noted that the ‘Ponzi’
classification is an instantaneous measure, and will partly reflect stochastic shocks in
demand—the profits of a ‘Ponzi’ firm may recover in the next period.
Despite the apparent financial fragility of firms in both this scenario and the ‘in-
termediate’ scenario (ζ = 0.7), the financial structure of the firms sector is steady—
the number of firms of each type remains roughly constant over time. In the high-
concentration scenario however, there is a steady rise in the number of firms switching
from ‘speculative’ to ‘Ponzi’ in each period: financial fragility is rising. But this is
taking place at the same time as the net financial deficit of the firms sector is falling and
investment as a share of output is rising.
While the scenario does not correspond exactly to a Minskian investment boom, it
does demonstrate how Minsky’s definition of rising financial fragility is compatible with
rising investment and a falling financial deficit of the firms’ sector—so long as firms are
heterogeneous. This also highlights the problems in assuming of a pure ‘horizontalist’
banking sector: banks continue lending to firms despite the increasing prevalence of
Ponzi units. With a more sophisticated model of bank behaviour, a point would be
reached at which banks would raise interest rates or restrain credit growth. Similarly,
the investment function implies that firms do not consider their financial fragility when
deciding on their investment and output decisions. With modifications to overcome
these shortcomings, the model could simulate a true ‘Minsky moment’ and credit crisis.
5.3 Sensitivity to excess capacity
Figure 6 shows how the behaviour of the system is altered by adjusting the sensitivity
of investment to the rate of profit and capacity utilisation. The rows contain series
already described in the previous sections. The columns are as follows: in all three
simulations, the concentration parameter is high: ζ = 0.9. The first column reproduces
the simulation shown in the rightmost column of the previous figures, but extends the
time-span.
The end result of the disequilibrium process will be total concentration—a single firm
dominating the market. At this point the model will behave in the same way as the
equivalent macro model.
The simulations show that as concentration progresses, the rate of profit initially
increases even as capacity utilisation falls. Eventually, this trend reverses as falling
aggregate demand erodes profits. From this point, output, capacity utilisation and the
rate of profit all decline steadily.
The second column shows how this process unfolds in the case that firms are less
sensitive to excess capacity. The baseline parameters shown in the index are adjusted:
γu is reduced to 0.01 and γr is increased to 0.3. In this case, while the absolute growth
rate is lower, the fall in growth as concentration takes place is much less severe: growth
falls from around 4% to around 3.75% compared to the previous case in which growth
falls from around 7.5% to around 5%.
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5.4 An increase in the interest rate
The final experiment demonstrates the effect of a rise in the rate of interest. Since interest
payments have no direct effect on investment and no distinction is made between wages
and interest income when making consumption decisions, a rise in the rate of interest
simply increases household income, raises consumption and thus increases aggregate
demand, output and capacity utilisation.
The rightmost column of Figure 6 shows a simulation with parameters set as in the
middle column. During the simulation (at t = 1100), the rate of interest is increased from
3% to 6%. Output growth, the rate of profit and capacity utilisation all immediately
increase in response. The effect on the firms sector is to shift around 200 firms from
speculative to Ponzi finance.
Since neither firms nor the banking system react, there is no further effect of this
change—the system continues its trajectory towards single-firm dominance. With firms
and the banking system modelled in a more sophisticated way, however, such a rise in
rates could be the tipping point leading to financial and economic crisis—the so-called
‘Minsky moment’.
6 Conclusion
Post Keynesian economics tends to overlook both the role of prices in distributing
profits and the role of market structure in distributing wages. Yet Steindl’s insights
on the ‘maldistribution of profits’ in capitalism hold considerable relevance for the era
of ‘financialisation’ in which the cash hoarding of monopolistic firms is matched by the
indebtedness of small firms and households.
Using agent-based techniques, Steindl’s insights are formalised and incorporated into
a simple stock-flow consistent model of the monetary circuit. Numerical simulations
generate the following results: investment cycles in a steady state growth path; dis-
proportionate profits, leverage and financial fragility among firms; rising concentration
alongside falling output and excess capacity; monopolisation accompanied an initially
rising rate of profit and an eventual reversal; and deepening financial fragility alongside
rising investment and a falling deficit for the corporate sector.
The results of this simple model demonstrate the potential of the SFC-ABM synthe-
sis. Stock-flow consistent techniques provide a method for formalising Post Keynesian
propositions—disproving claims that Post Keynesian economics lacks ‘coherence, for-
malism and logic’ (Lavoie & Godley, 2001, p. 307) and providing an alternative to
mainstream models of optimising representative agents and ‘rational’ expectations.
The mainstream has moved on, however, since the crisis: the representative-agent, a
target of much criticism, has increasingly been replaced with heterogeneous agents. As-
pects of stock-flow accounting have been incorporated into dynamic general equilibrium
models. Post Keynesian economics needs to keep pace with these developments.
The introduction of hetergenous agents into stock-flow models has enormous
potential—With a heterogeneous household sector, models will incorporate the
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dynamics of income distribution, speculative financial behaviour and debt-financed
consumption and asset purchases. Price-setting and wage-bargaining by workers and
firms will be modelled on the basis of differential market power and decentralised
wage-bargaining and price setting. Heterogeneous banks will enable modelling of the
distribution of liquidity, capital and risk alongside recent financial developments such as
securitision, derivatives trading and repo lending. All of these features will be included
in models while retaining the key features of Post Keynesian monetary macroeconomics:
endogenous creation of credit money and disequlibrium adjustment mechanisms, even
in the long run.
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Appendix: Notation, parameters and simulation
figures
Notation
Demand and supply are denoted by uppercase subscripts. For example, consumption
demand, CD and consumption supply, CS.
Macroeconomic sectors (firms, households) are denoted by lower-case subscript for
sectors. For example, deposits held by households, Dh and deposits held by firms, Df .
Variables referring to magnitudes associated with individual firms are indexed by
subscript i. For example, the output produced by firm i is denoted yi.
Previous period values are denoted by subscript (−1). For example, previous-period
output is denoted Y(−1).
Desired and expected values are denoted by superscript D and E. For example, firms’
desired deposits, FD and firms’ expected deposits, FE.
List of parameters
Symbol Value Description
N 1000 Number of firms
α1 0.7 Consumption out of income
α2 0.1 Consumption out of wealth
γ0 0.02 Animal spirits
γr 0.2 Sensitivity of investment to profit rate
γu 0.04 Sensitivity of investment to capacity utilisation
ρ 0.2 Desired inventory to output ratio
θ 0.5 Desired liquidity of firms as percentage of current costs
v 4 Capital/full capacity output ratio
r¯ 0.03 Rate of interest
T 0.25 Average mark-up
ζ 0.5–0.9 Strength of monopolisation tendency
Simulation figures
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Figure 3 By row from top: 1. distribution of capital; 2. GDP and investment growth; 3.
aggregate profit rate; 4. aggregate utilisation rate; 5. aggregate wage share
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Figure 4 By row from top, distribution of: 1. growth rates; 2. profit rates; 3. capacity
utilisation; 4. loans (nominal); 5. loans, deposits, net leverage (% of capital)
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Figure 5 Top row: household saving (% of GDP); bottom row: firms’ financial structure
(number of firms)
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Figure 6 By row from top: 1. GDP and investment growth; 2. aggregate profit rate; 3.
aggregate utilisation rate; 4. household saving; 5. financial structure
